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INTRODUCTION
The common law of conduct-based, foreign official immunity in the
United States is in a state of flux. In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
finding in Samantar v. Yousuf that individual foreign official immunity is
no longer governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), but
rather by common law,1 the federal circuit courts of appeals have diverged
Copyright © 2016 Christopher D. Totten
* Associate Professor of Criminal Justice (Law), Dept. of Sociology and Criminal Justice,
Kennesaw State University. The author would like to thank James Purdon for his research assistance
related to this Article.
1. See generally Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010). Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion in Samantar, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Alito and Sotomayor joined. Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia wrote concurring opinions. Id. at 306.
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on two pivotal issues related to conduct-based, foreign official immunity.
The first is how much deference, or “weight,” to give an executive branch
suggestion of immunity (SOI). The second is whether to recognize a jus
cogens exception to this conduct-based immunity.2 This Article analyzes
the implications of these two key splits—not only for outcomes, but for
fairness, consistency, deterrence, and impunity. It also addresses strategies
putative plaintiffs may wish to adopt to “pierce the veil” of immunity.
These strategies are based on jurisprudence related to the “splits” and on
other post-Samantar cases addressing both conduct-based, foreign official
and status-based, head of state immunity.
The uncertainty surrounding conduct-based, foreign official immunity
may mean that defendants will experience disparate outcomes in similar
cases, creating deterrence-related challenges and perceived unfairness. This
uncertainty also makes it less likely that litigants will be able to predict
For an explanation of the differences between the conduct-based and status-based varieties, or “types,”
of foreign official immunity, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the
U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 234–35 (2011)
([“…Customary International Law] has long distinguished between immunity based on the status of a
government official and immunity based on the subject matter of an official's conduct. With respect to
the first type of immunity, referred to as “status immunity” or “immunity ratione personae,” certain
officials such as diplomats and “heads of state” (a category that includes presidents, prime ministers,
monarchs, and foreign ministers) are immune from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of other nations'
courts. Status immunity is substantively broad; it applies to all claims against the official, regardless of
whether they concern public or private acts or whether the acts took place during the official's time in
office. But status immunity is also temporary; it ends when the official leaves office. The second type of
immunity is “conduct immunity” or “immunity ratione materiae.” Unlike status immunity, conduct
immunity “covers only official acts, that is, conduct adopted by a State official in the discharge of his or
her functions.” Inasmuch as conduct immunity is based on the individual's actions and not his personal
status, it extends to all government officials who carry out state functions. For the same reason, conduct
immunity does not depend on whether the official is currently in office and thus applies equally to
former officials.” Id. at 234-35 (quoting Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction: Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat, International Law Commission, 60th Sess (Mar
31, 2008), UN Doc A/CN.4/596 36 at ¶ 148)(other internal citations omitted). For the rationales
underlying these two types of foreign official immunities, see id.
2. See infra Part II for a detailed description of the two “splits.” For an explanation of a jus
cogens norm, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common
Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 236–37 (2011)(“[A] growing number of
domestic and international judicial decisions have considered whether a foreign official acts as an arm
of the state, and thus is entitled to conduct immunity, when that official allegedly violates a jus cogens
norm of international law or commits an international crime. A jus cogens norm is a rule of
international law that has been “accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Norms commonly said to
qualify as jus cogens include the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture. International crimes
include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”) Id. at 236–37 (quoting Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 53, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 332, 8 Intl Leg Mat 679 (1969)(other
internal citations omitted). For purposes of this Article, all of these norms, prohibitions, and crimes fall
under the rubric, or category, of “jus cogens.”
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immunity outcomes in individual cases, muddling their decision-making
calculus and creating associated inefficiencies.3
Moreover, the aforementioned divergence, or “split,” may be
connected to the status of foreign precedent and customary international
law with regard to conduct-based immunity. For example, the split in the
federal circuit courts on whether a jus cogens exception to conduct-based
immunity exists for foreign officials may itself reflect uncertainty in
customary international law and foreign national precedent on this issue (at
least in the civil context).4 But although this law and these precedents can
inform judicial decision-making on the issue in the United States,5 both the
ultimate resolution of the split and the particular direction U.S.
jurisprudence will take on this issue, awaits a future decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court or, perhaps, congressional intervention through targeted
legislation. Evolving U.S. jurisprudence on this issue may, in turn,
contribute to the development of customary international law.
However, in the wake of Samantar, there is uniform agreement among
the lower courts in the United States that executive branch guidance in the
context of status-based, head of state immunity is determinative, though
certain limited exceptions to this immunity have been recognized.6 In
addition, the jurisprudence following Samantar suggests several possible
strategies for plaintiffs suing heads of state and foreign officials claiming
immunity for alleged human rights and other abuses, including exerting
certain pressures on the executive branch and obtaining a waiver from the
foreign state.7 Plaintiffs suing foreign officials may also wish to consider
certain strategies related to “forum-shopping,” framing their allegations,
and selecting a case theory.8 Though these tactics do not ensure that courts
will pierce the immunity veil, and may not be available in all cases, the
strategies at least offer plaintiffs possible avenues for overcoming
immunity.
Part I explains the landmark Samantar v. Yousuf case in detail. Part II
then describes the aforementioned circuit splits. Part III canvases key post3. Some litigants may believe—incorrectly—that they can succeed at trial and forego settlement.
Others may not want to risk losing at trial and settle cases they could perhaps have won, thereby
stymieing jurisprudential development.
4. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 60, 77, 118, and 127.
8. See infra notes 135–139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the strategies related to
forum shopping and framing allegations and case theory. For a discussion of waiver, see infra notes 127
and 132 and accompanying text. For the general idea of exerting pressure on the executive branch to
influence its guidance on the immunity question, see infra notes 118 and 132 and accompanying text.
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Samantar decisions issued by U.S. district courts both on conduct-based,
foreign official immunity and on status-based, head of state immunity. The
cases selected for inclusion in Part III illustrate strategies plaintiffs may
wish to adopt to overcome these immunities. Part IV analyzes the
implications of the two circuit splits described in Part II regarding the
appropriate level of judicial deference to afford executive SOIs in the
conduct-based, foreign official immunity context, and on whether this
immunity should be granted to officials in cases of alleged jus cogens
violations. Part IV also examines status-based, head of state immunity
issues in the wake of Samantar, including deference to executive SOIs in
this context and possible immunity exceptions. Finally, Part IV explores
certain strategic considerations for plaintiffs suing foreign officials for
human rights abuses in U.S. courts.
I. SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF
In Samantar v. Yousuf, plaintiffs-respondents were several Somalis
who sought damages under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for torture and extrajudicial killings allegedly
authorized by defendant-petitioner Samantar.9 At the time of the alleged
acts, Samantar was the First Vice-President and Minister of Defense of
Somalia and had served as the Prime Minister during the 1980s.10
However, in 1991, Samantar fled Somalia for the United States. The United
States declined to recognize any official government of Somalia following
the collapse of the military regime in that country in the early 1990s.11
The federal district court in Samantar found that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because Samantar was entitled to
official immunity under the FSIA.12 The court also found that the FSIA
applied to individual officials acting on behalf of the state in their official
capacity.13 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, reversed.
It held, citing the statute’s text and structure, that the FSIA did not apply to
individual officials.14
9. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010) (“Respondents are members of the Isaaq clan,
which included well-educated and prosperous Somalis who were subjected to systematic persecution
during the 1980’s by the military regime then governing Somalia. They allege that petitioner exercised
command and control over members of the Somali military forces who tortured, killed, or arbitrarily
detained them or members of their families; that petitioner knew or should have known of the abuses
perpetrated by his subordinates; and that he aided and abetted the commission of these abuses.”).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 308–09.
12. Id. at 309.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 310.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis in Samantar by tracing the
history of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States, noting that it
had developed under the common law in the landmark case of Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon:
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity developed as a matter of
common law long before the FSIA was enacted in 1976. In
Verlinden . . ., we explained that in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon . . .
, “Chief Justice Marshall concluded that . . . the United States had
impliedly waived jurisdiction over certain activities of foreign
sovereigns.” The Court’s specific holding in Schooner Exchange was
that a federal court lacked jurisdiction over “a national armed vessel . . .
of the emperor of France,” . . . but the opinion was interpreted as
extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns as “a matter
of grace and comity[.]”15

According to the Court in Samantar, a two-pronged procedure developed at
common law for deciding questions of foreign sovereign immunity,
including questions of foreign official immunity, following Schooner
Exchange. First, a foreign state’s representative requests an SOI for itself or
its official from the United States Department of State. Then, if the request
is granted, the district court declines to exercise its jurisdiction over the
sovereign or official.16 In addition, the Court noted that although the State
Department had previously sought “immunity in all actions against friendly
sovereigns,”17 it began to follow an immunity approach known as the
restrictive approach, or “theory,” of immunity in 1952.
Under the restrictive theory—laid down in the now-famous Tate
Letter18—foreign states have immunity for official, public acts but do not
enjoy immunity for commercial acts.19 Unfortunately, the State Department
did not always follow its own guidance as a result of political pressure, and,
at times, recommended the immunity of a foreign state even though it had
15. Id. at 311 (third and fourth ellipses in original) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 146 (1812))).
16. Id. at 311–12. If the State Department did not issue an SOI, the district court decided the
immunity question itself. In so doing, the “district court inquired ‘whether the ground of immunity is
one which it is the established policy of the [State Department] to recognize.’” Id. at 312 (alteration in
original) (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486–87); see Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26
Dept. State Bull. 984–85 (1952).
19. See id. (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487). States engage in commercial acts when they
perform acts in a way that is similar to a corporation engaged in business-related activities (e.g.,
purchasing and selling goods for profit, etc.).
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engaged in commercial activity.20 Due to the inconsistencies in State
Department SOIs under the Tate Letter, Congress codified the common law
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in 1976 by passing the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).21 In so doing, Congress
shifted the task of determining immunity from the State Department to the
courts.22
In light of this history, the Court in Samantar initially framed the issue
and holding as follows:
[W]hether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA or
Act) . . . provides petitioner [Samantar] with immunity from suit based
on actions taken in his official capacity. We hold that the FSIA does not
govern the determination of petitioner’s immunity from suit.23

And later in its opinion, the Court commented:
Our review of the text, purpose, and history of the FSIA leads us to the
conclusion that the Court of Appeals correctly held the FSIA does not
govern petitioner’s claim of immunity. The Act therefore did not deprive
the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.24

In holding that the FSIA did not apply to individual foreign officials,
the Court looked to the text of the FSIA. The Court focused, in particular,
on the fact that individuals sued for conduct undertaken in their official
capacities are not “foreign states” subject to immunity under the FSIA. The
FSIA’s definition of foreign state includes its political subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities.25 The Court held that this phasing does not
encompass foreign officials because,
Congress has specifically defined “agency or instrumentality” in the
FSIA, and all of the textual clues in that definition cut against such a
broad construction. . . . [T]he statute specifies that “‘agency or
instrumentality . . .’ means any entity” matching three [particular]
20. See id. at 312–13 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004) (quoting
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487)).
21. See id.
22. Id. at 313 (citing Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690–91; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487–88; Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 [FSIA], 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012)). The Court also said that “[a]fter
the enactment of the FSIA, the Act—and not the pre-existing common law—indisputably governs the
determination of whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity.” Id.
23. Id. at 308 (citing FSIA §§ 1330, 1602–11).
24. Id. at 325.
25. See FSIA § 1603(a).
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characteristics, . . . and “entity” typically refers to an organization, rather
than an individual.26

In addition, the FSIA statutory terms “agency and instrumentality”
refer to an entity which is a “separate legal person . . . .”27 According to the
Court in Samantar, this definition ordinarily refers to entities, not to
individual persons:
The phrase “separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,” . . . could
conceivably refer to a natural person, solely by virtue of the word
“person.” But the phrase “separate legal person” typically refers to the
legal fiction that allows an entity to hold personhood separate from the
natural persons who are its shareholders or officers.28

Moreover, an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA must be either
“an organ of a foreign state” or an entity “a majority of whose shares or
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state.”29 According to the
Court, “[i]t is similarly awkward to refer to a person as an ‘organ’ of the
foreign state.”30 Finally, under the FSIA, an agency or instrumentality
means an entity “which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in [certain FSIA subsections], nor created under the laws of any
third country.”31 According to the Court, this aspect of the “agency or
instrumentality” definition:
could not be applied at all to a natural person. A natural person cannot be
a citizen of a State [under the applicable FSIA subsections], because
those subsections refer to the citizenship of corporations and estates. Nor
can a natural person be ‘created under the laws of any third country.’32

Thus, the Court held that Congress did not intend to include individual
officials in the meaning of “agency or instrumentality.”33

26. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 315 (second ellipsis in original) (citing FSIA § 1603(b) &); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 612 (9th ed. 2009)).
27. FSIA § 1603(b)(1).
28. Id. at 315 (emphasis added) (citing FSIA § 1603(b)(1)).
29. Id. at 314 (quoting FSIA § 1603(b)(2)).
30. Id. at 315 (citing FSIA § 1603(b)(2)).
31. Id. at 314 (quoting FSIA § 1603(b)(3)).
32. Id. at 315–16.
33. Id. at 314–15.
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The Court rejected defendant’s argument that the FSIA’s basic
definition of foreign state can include individual officials because the
definition itself is illustrative, not exclusive:
[Defendant] argues that the definition of “foreign state” . . . sets out a
nonexhaustive list that “includes” political subdivisions and agencies or
instrumentalities but is not so limited . . . . . It is true that use of the word
“include” can signal that the list that follows is meant to be illustrative
rather than exhaustive. . . . But even if the list [defining foreign state] is
merely illustrative, it still suggests that “foreign state” does not
encompass officials, because the types of defendants listed are all
entities.34

Furthermore, the Court pointed out that had Congress intended to
include individuals within the meaning of the term “foreign state,” it would
have more directly stated its intent since it had done so in other parts of the
FSIA.35 In particular, the Court explained that the FSIA’s tortious activity
exception to foreign state immunity, unlike the “foreign state” definition,
includes a specific reference to individual officials and employees.36
According to the Court, “[i]f the term ‘foreign state’ by definition includes
an individual acting within the scope of his office, the phrase ‘or of any
official or employee . . .’ in [the FSIA tortious activity exception] would be
unnecessary.”37 In addition, according to the Court, other FSIA provisions,
such as those dealing with service of process and remedies, counsel against
interpreting the “foreign state” definition to include individuals.38
The Court also disagreed with defendant’s argument that “because
state and official immunities are coextensive, Congress must have codified
official immunity when it codified state immunity [in the FSIA].”39 This
caveat relates to the fact that, according to the Restatement of Foreign
Relations, the “immunity of a foreign state . . . extends to . . . any other
public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed
in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to
34. Id. at 316–17 (footnote omitted) (citing FSIA § 1603(a); Russell v. United States, 261 U.S.
514 (1923)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 318 (ellipsis in original) (citing FSIA § 1605(a)(5) (tortious activity exception); Dole
Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476–77 (2003)).
38. Id. (“Congress made no express mention of service of process on individuals in § 1608(a) . . .,
which governs service upon a foreign state or political subdivision.”); id. at 319 (“The Act's careful
calibration of remedies among the listed types of defendants suggests that Congress did not mean to
cover other types of defendants [i.e., individual officials] never mentioned in the text.”).
39. Id. at 321.
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enforce a rule of law against the state.”40 The Court also pointed out that
the U.S. government had, in the past, suggested immunity for officials even
though the state did not enjoy immunity under the FSIA.41 In sum, the
Court found “little reason to presume that when Congress set out to codify
state immunity, it must also have, sub silentio, intended to codify official
immunity.”42
Furthermore, the Court noted that the legislative history of FSIA does
not reflect that Congress intended to include individual officials within the
scope of the statute.43 In particular, the Court emphasized that Congress did
not intend the FSIA to remove the State Department’s role in foreign
official immunity decisions.44
Finally, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that “artful
pleading” by plaintiffs who chose to proceed against the foreign official
under the common law would make the FSIA “optional.” In this regard, the
Court said that:
Even if a suit is not governed by the Act, it may still be barred by foreign
sovereign immunity under the common law. And not every suit can
successfully be pleaded against an individual official alone. Even when a
plaintiff names only a foreign official, it may be the case that the foreign
state itself, its political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality is a
required party, because that party has “an interest relating to the subject
of the action” and “disposing of the action in the person’s absence
may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to
protect the interest.” . . . If this is the case, and the entity is immune from
suit under the FSIA, the district court may have to dismiss the suit,
regardless of whether the official is immune or not under the common
law.45

40. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66 (AM. LAW INST.
1965)) (italics in original).
41. Id. at 321–22.
42. Id. at 322.
43. Id. at 323 (“[T]he legislative history points toward an intent to leave official immunity outside
the scope of the Act. . . . And although questions of official immunity did arise in the pre-FSIA period,
they were few and far between. The immunity of officials simply was not the particular problem to
which Congress was responding when it enacted the FSIA.” (footnote omitted)).
44. Id. (“We have been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to
eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding individual official immunity.”).
45. Id. at 324–25 (footnote omitted) (first ellipsis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
19(a)(1)(B)). And in a subsequent passage, the Court said: “We are thus not persuaded that our
construction of the statute's text should be affected by the risk that plaintiffs may use artful pleading to
attempt to select between application of the FSIA or the common law. And we think this case, in which
respondents have sued petitioner in his personal capacity and seek damages from his own pockets, is
properly governed by the common law because it is not a claim against a foreign state as the Act defines
that term.” Id. at 325.
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Accordingly, regardless of how the plaintiff originally pleads her case, the
foreign state may be determined to be a required party. If the foreign state
is a required party, the state may be found immune under the FSIA. This
finding, in turn, will lead to the termination of the suit regardless of the
official’s immunity status under the common law. In addition, the Court
found that in certain suits against foreign officials, the state may be the real
party in interest. And, where that is the case, the FSIA would apply
regardless of how the plaintiff originally pleaded her case.46 Under the facts
of Samantar, the Court concluded that the common law applied because the
suit was both directed against and sought damages from Samantar in his
personal capacity; however, the court remanded the case back to the district
court to decide whether defendant was ultimately entitled to immunity.47
II. POST-SAMANTAR CIRCUIT SPLIT
In the approximately five years since Samantar was decided, a split
has emerged among the federal appellate circuits on two significant issues
related to determinations of conduct-based, foreign official immunity: (1)
the degree of deference courts should give to an SOI by the executive
branch; and (2) whether there is a jus cogens exception to immunity for
certain grave, international human rights abuses. The differing approaches
taken by the Fourth and Second Circuits illustrate the substance of the
circuit split.

46. Id. at 325 (in particular, the Court said that “it may be the case that some actions against an
official in his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is
the real party in interest”).
47. Id. at 325–26. See also supra note 45.
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A. The Fourth Circuit: Yousuf v. Samantar48 (“Samantar II”)
On remand from the Supreme Court decision in Samantar, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the executive
branch’s SOI expressly opposing immunity for defendant Samantar
(“Defendant”) was entitled to considerable deference and denied Defendant
immunity under the common law. In particular, according to the Fourth
Circuit:
[I]n denying Samantar’s subsequent motion to reconsider, the district
court implied that it performed its own analysis and merely took the
State Department’s view into account: “The Executive Branch has
spoken on this issue and . . . [is] entitled to a great deal of deference.
They don’t control but they are entitled to deference in this case.” The
district court noted that both “the residency of the defendant” and “the
lack of a recognized government” were factors properly considered in
the immunity calculus.49

The executive branch based its SOI on the overall impact it would
have on the foreign relations of the United States as well as on two specific
considerations. First, although Defendant was a former state official, no
recognized government existed to request immunity or to comment on the
official nature of his acts. Since immunity for acts rendered in an official
capacity stems from the immunity of the foreign state itself, the executive
branch reasoned that Defendant could not justifiably receive immunity
unless a foreign state existed to claim it.50 Second, Defendant was a
permanent legal resident of the United States who “enjoy[s] the protections

48. 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012). For a summary of the status of the jos cogens exception prior to
Samantar under the FSIA, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S.
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 264–65 (2011)( “A related issue
concerns the governmental character of abusive police conduct, including torture. When interpreting the
FSIA, the Supreme Court has explained that “however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be,” it is
a “peculiarly sovereign” activity shielded by immunity. Similarly, a number of circuit courts have held
that even jus cogens violations by a state fall within the immunity provided for in the FSIA and have
rejected arguments that a state constructively waives its immunity when it engages in such conduct.
These conclusions are in tension with the holdings of several lower federal courts, which, prior to
Samantar, held that torture and other jus cogens violations are not official acts and that, as a result, the
individuals who commit them were not entitled to immunity under the FSIA or to dismissal under the
act of state doctrine.” Id. (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 US 349, 361 (1993)(other citations
omitted).
49. Id. at 767–68 (third ellipsis and alteration in original) (quoting Yousuf v. Samantar, No.
1:04CV1360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb 15, 2011)).
50. Id. at 767.
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of [United States] law,” and should, therefore, “be subject to the
jurisdiction of [United States] courts.”51
In Samantar II, the Fourth Circuit examined how much deference U.S.
courts should give SOIs by the State Department in foreign official
immunity cases.52 The court found that following the landmark Schooner
Exchange case, which established the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity,53 there had not been complete deference to the executive branch
in cases involving questions of foreign sovereign immunity.54 By the
1930s, however, courts had begun to regard executive branch
determinations concerning foreign sovereign immunity as controlling.55
Courts faced with a foreign sovereign immunity claim generally applied the
two-step procedure involving the evaluation of whether the foreign state
had requested an SOI from the executive branch, whether that request was
granted, and if not, whether it (the court) believed immunity should be
granted based on established branch policy.56 According to the Fourth
Circuit, the decision by the State Department to adopt the restrictive view
of foreign sovereign immunity in the Tate Letter had little effect on courts’
deference to State Department SOIs.57 By the time Congress passed the
FSIA in 1976, the “clearly established practice of judicial deference to
executive immunity determinations had been expressed largely in admiralty
cases.”58
51. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
52. Id. at 769–70. As part of this analysis, the Court recognized the two distinct immunities of
head of state immunity and foreign official immunity, both of which were claimed by defendant
Samantar. See id.
53. Id. at 770 (“Foreign sovereign immunity, insofar as American courts are concerned, has its
doctrinal roots in [Schooner Exchange], which ushered in nearly a century of ‘absolute’ or ‘classical’
immunity, ‘under which a sovereign [could not], without his consent, be made a respondent in the
courts of another sovereign.’” (quoting Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of
New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007))).
54. Id. (“‘Absolute’ immunity for the foreign sovereign, however, is not to be confused with
absolute judicial deference to the Executive Branch. In fact, during the lengthy period of absolute
immunity, courts did not necessarily consider themselves obliged to follow executive pronouncements
regarding immunity.”). The Court of Appeals noted that in 1921, in Berizzi Brothers, the United States
Supreme Court found “that a steamship owned by a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity despite
the fact that the Secretary of State had expressed the opposite view earlier in the litigation.” Id. at 770–
71 (citing Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576 (1926)).
55. Id. at 771 (noting, for example, in the specific context of admiralty suits against foreign ships,
“[i]t was not until the late 1930s—in the context of in rem actions against foreign ships—that judicial
deference to executive foreign immunity determinations emerged as standard practice” (citing The
Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30 (1945))).
56. Id. (quoting Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36)).
57. Id. at 771 n.5 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004)).
58. Id. at 771–72.

TOTTEN FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2016

POST-SAMANTAR: A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

7/9/2016 11:43 PM

529

In addition, the Fourth Circuit noted that the power to receive
ambassadors is bestowed upon the executive branch under Article II,
Section III of the U.S. Constitution. This provision, the court reasoned,
impliedly confers the power to recognize foreign heads of state on the
executive branch. It then held that because the State Department’s power to
issue SOIs for heads of state is a constitutional power, those SOIs are
entitled to absolute deference.59 In light of this constitutional pedigree and
the wealth of precedent finding that executive branch guidance on head of
state immunity questions binds courts, the Fourth Circuit determined that
Defendant was not entitled to head of state immunity.60
But because the constitutional considerations are different, the Court
of Appeals determined that State Department guidance in the conductbased foreign official immunity context is not controlling, despite being
entitled to “substantial weight.” For example, the Court explained that
foreign official immunity cases “do not involve any act of recognition . . .
rather, they simply involve matters about the scope of defendant’s official
duties.”61 Significantly, the Court nevertheless recognized that the
Executive Branch still plays an important advisory role in foreign official
immunity cases because they implicate CIL and foreign policy
considerations.62 In sum, the Court found that it affords complete deference
to the State Department’s finding on head-of-state immunity but that
regarding conduct-based immunity, the Department’s view is “not
controlling, but it carries substantial weight in our analysis.”63
Finally, to determine whether Defendant was entitled to foreign
official immunity, the Fourth Circuit looked to immunity law in the United
States and internationally as well as to executive branch guidance. The
court noted that international law, in particular, has played an influential
59. See id. at 772.
60. See id. (“[T]he State Department's pronouncement as to head-of-state immunity is entitled to
absolute deference. The State Department has never recognized Samantar as the head of state for
Somalia; indeed, the State Department does not recognize the Transitional Federal Government or any
other entity as the official government of Somalia, from which immunity would derive in the first place.
The district court properly deferred to the State Department's position that Samantar be denied head-ofstate immunity.”).
61. Id. at 773.
62. Id. (“This is not to say, however, that the Executive Branch has no role . . . These immunity
decisions turn upon principles of customary international law and foreign policy, areas in which the
courts respect . . . the views of the Executive Branch. . . . With respect to foreign official immunity, the
Executive Branch still informs the court about the diplomatic effect of the court's exercising jurisdiction
over claims against an official of a foreign state, and the Executive Branch may urge the court to grant
or deny official-act immunity based on such considerations.” (citations omitted) (citing Peter B.
Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589,
606 (2011))).
63. Id.
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role in foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence and legislation
throughout U.S. history.64 In addition, the United States, and in particular
the Supreme Court, has adopted “the international law principle that
sovereign immunity, which belongs to a foreign state, extends to an
individual official acting on behalf of that foreign state.”65 However, “[a]
foreign official or former head-of-state will . . . not be able to assert this
immunity for private [or individual] acts that are not arguably attributable
to the state, such as drug possession or fraud.”66 In addition, the court
concluded that under international law, jus cogens violations are essentially
private acts for which official immunity may not be warranted:
There has been an increasing trend in international law [following the
Pinochet decision] to abrogate foreign official immunity for individuals
who commit acts, otherwise attributable to the State, that violate jus
cogens norms—i.e., they commit international crimes or human rights
violations[.]67

Furthermore, according to the Fourth Circuit, conduct-based foreign
official immunity does not extend to violations of jus cogens norms, but
head of state immunity still applied notwithstanding these violations.68 In
sum, the Fourth Circuit held that based on United States and international
64. Id. at 773–74.
65. Id. at 774 (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). The Court of Appeals
elaborated that “[b]y the time the FSIA was enacted, numerous domestic courts had embraced the
notion, stemming from international law, that ‘[t]he immunity of a foreign state . . . extends to . . . any .
. . public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if
the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.’” Id. (all
alternations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (AM.
LAW INST. 1965)).
66. Id. at 775 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)).
67. Id. at 777 (citing Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S.
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 236–37 (2011)). The Court of
Appeals noted that “[a] number of decisions from foreign national courts have reflected a willingness to
deny official-act immunity in the criminal context for alleged jus cogens violations, most notably the
British House of Lords’ Pinochet decision denying official-acts immunity to a former Chilean head of
state accused of directing widespread torture.” Id. (citing R v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet [1999] 1 AC
147 (HL) 203–06 (appeal taken from Eng.). Interestingly, in the civil context, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that “[s]ome foreign national courts have pierced the veil of official-acts immunity to hear
civil claims alleging jus cogens violations, but the jus cogens exception appears to be less settled in the
civil context.” Id. (citing Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2004, I (It.) [Ferrini v.
Republic of Germany]); Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [24], [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 (Lord
Bingham of Cornhill LJ) (appeal taken from Eng.)). The Court interpreted Jones as “rejecting [a] jus
cogens exception to foreign official immunity in [the] civil context.” Id.
68. Id. (“American courts have generally [found] that jus cogens violations are not legitimate
official acts and therefore do not merit foreign official immunity but still recognizing that head-of-state
immunity, based on status, is of an absolute nature and applies even against jus cogens claims.”).
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law, foreign officials “are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus
cogens violations, even if they were performed in their official capacity.”69
Finally, the Fourth Circuit gave substantial weight to the factors
underlying the State Department’s executive guidance that Defendant
ought to be denied immunity.70 In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held
that Defendant was not entitled to conduct-based, foreign official immunity
under the common law because of both the various jus cogens violations
and the particular executive branch guidance involved in the case.71
B. The Second Circuit: Rosenberg v. Pasha
Plaintiffs-appellants (“Plaintiffs”) were American and Israeli citizens
who were victims or relatives of victims injured or killed during terrorist
attacks in Mumbai, India. Plaintiffs alleged that the attacks themselves
were committed, in part, by Pakistani nationals of Lashkar-E-Taiba (“LeT”), a United States government-designated terrorist organization.72
Plaintiffs further alleged that the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of
Pakistan (“ISI”), and in particular two of its former Directors General,
Ahmed Shuja Pasha and Nadeem Taj (“Pasha and Taj”), carried out
intelligence gathering for the Pakistani military and essentially coordinated
the attacks with Le-T.73 Plaintiffs brought suit under the TVPA, the ATS,
and the Antiterrorism Act.74 The district court had held that Pasha and Taj
were protected from suit by common law sovereign immunity, basing its
decision on the SOI provided by the State Department which stipulated that
Pasha and Taj were foreign officials acting within the scope of their
positions.75 Plaintiffs, relying upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Samantar II, argued that immunity should not apply to defendants Pasha
and Taj because they committed jus cogens violations; moreover, plaintiffs
argued that under Samantar II, SOIs themselves are not entitled to absolute

69. Id. The Fourth Circuit also found that “Congress's enactment of the TVPA, and the policies it
reflects, [is] both instructive and consistent with our view of the common law regarding these aspects of
jus cogens.” Id.
70. Id. at 777–78. For a list of the factors put forth by the State Department in suggesting
Samantar be denied immunity, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 778.
72. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 Fed. Appx. 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2014).
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id.
75. Id. The District Court had earlier found that ISI itself should receive immunity under the
FSIA since no exception (to immunity) applied and the United States executive branch had suggested
immunity. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342–43 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Based
on the pleadings and the record in these actions, the Court is satisfied that the ISI has met its burden
under the FSIA and the ISI is entitled to immunity from these actions.”).
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deference.76 However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Pasha was not persuaded. The Second Circuit held that under Matar v.
Dichter, absolute deference to the executive branch is warranted in foreign
official immunity claims. It also held that, under Matar, jus cogens
violations do not overcome these immunity claims.77 Specifically, the
Second Circuit disagreed with plaintiffs’ contention that Matar had been
overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar. According to the
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court did not address common law official
immunity in any significant way and, therefore, did not overrule Matar. On
the contrary, the Second Circuit pointed out, the Supreme Court noted that
“[w]hether [the foreign official] may be entitled to immunity under the
common law . . . [is a] matter [ ] to be addressed in the first instance . . . on
remand.”78 Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
opinion finding conduct-based, foreign official immunity for defendants
Pasha and Taj in accordance with the executive branch’s SOI.79
III. OTHER KEY, POST-SAMANTAR CASES
Several federal district court opinions in the wake of Samantar have
expounded upon its holding and rationale related to foreign official
immunity. While some of these cases address the issues pertaining to the
split described in the preceding Part (Part II), others shed light on certain
strategies plaintiffs may adopt to potentially overcome the immunity of
foreign officials. This Part will examine cases involving the conduct-based
immunity of foreign officials before turning to those implicating statusbased immunity.
A. Foreign Official, Conduct-based Immunity Cases
In Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Plaintiffs were legal representatives of
individuals allegedly killed at the hands of a paramilitary group in
76. Rosenberg, 577 Fed. Appx. at 23 (citing Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773, 777).
77. Id. (citing Matar v. Dichter, 563 F. 3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009)).
78. Id. at 24 (alterations in original) (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010)).
Note that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had previously found that there is “no jus cogens
exception to the FSIA.” Rosenberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (citing Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242–45 (2d Cir. 1996)).
79. Rosenberg, 577 Fed. Appx. at 24. The Court of Appeals said that “Matar remains binding
precedent in this Circuit, and in applying it, the District Court correctly determined that, in light of the
Statement of Interest filed by the State Department recommending immunity for Pasha and Taj, the
action must be dismissed.” Id. Regarding defendants/appellees, the District Court had said that “it is the
position of the Executive Branch that defendants Pasha and Taj, former Directors General of the ISI, are
entitled to foreign sovereign immunity under the common law as foreign officials who were sued in
their official capacity for acts conducted in their official capacity. Under the common law on sovereign
immunity, the Court’s inquiry ends here.” Rosenberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
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Columbia.80 They sought to compel the testimony of the former President
of Columbia, Alvaro Uribe, concerning his alleged involvement with the
paramilitary group during his presidency.81 The executive branch issued an
SOI affirmatively recognizing the former president’s immunity from
testifying about his official actions while president.82
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Giraldo first noted
that in cases where the executive branch issued an SOI affirmatively
granting immunity to a former president, the traditional or historical
practice had been for courts to defer to that guidance.83 The district court
rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the testimony they sought related to
conduct that had occurred before Uribe was president, reasoning that the
testimony “still relate[d] to information he received and acts he took in his
official capacity as a government official—[in this case as] the Governor of
[the department of] Antioquia.”84 In response to the Plaintiffs’ argument
that the former President’s conduct consisted of “unofficial” actions, the
district court determined that “allegations of illegality do not serve to
render an action unofficial for purposes of foreign official immunity. . . .
[S]uch a rule [that illegal actions fall outside the scope of official
immunity] would eviscerate the protection of foreign official immunity and
would contravene federal law. . . .”85
The district court also pointed out that under its own precedent even
violations of jus cogens norms—which plaintiffs alleged the former
president had perpetrated—do not fall outside the scope of foreign official
immunity: “The D.C. Circuit has rejected the argument that jus cogens
violations defeat foreign official immunity in the context of the [FSIA],”
and the district court found this conclusion “instructive” even given
Samantar’s holding that FSIA did not apply to individual, foreign official
80. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248 (D.D.C. 2011).
81. Id. Plaintiffs brought their claims against a certain corporation, its subsidiaries and employees
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and extrajudicial killings under the ATS and TVPA. Id.
Plaintiffs also sought testimony from the former president regarding conduct that transpired while he
was a provincial governor in Columbia. Id. at 249.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311). The District Court then observed, “In this case, the
State Department has granted respondent's request for a suggestion of immunity and suggests that
former President Uribe enjoys residual immunity as to information relating to acts taken or obtained in
his official capacity as a government official. . . . Plaintiffs do not take issue with this standard [as
reiterated in Samantar] for determining respondent's immunity [i.e., if the State Department grants
immunity, the district court surrenders jurisdiction over the case].” Id. See also Abi Joudi & Azar
Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins., 391 Fed. Appx. 173, 178–80 (3d Cir. 2010) (remanding foreign
official immunity claims in order to allow parties to argue these claims under the common law in light
of Samantar and in order to allow executive branch to provide guidance concerning these claims).
84. Giraldo, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 249–50.
85. Id. at 249–50.
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immunity claims.86 The district court reasoned that a jus cogens exception
would “place a strain upon our courts [in the form of innumerous human
rights lawsuits] and our diplomatic relations, [and] it would also eviscerate
any protection that foreign official immunity affords.”87 Basing its
reasoning for declining to recognize this exception on its own precedent as
well as foreign precedent, the court commented that:
As soon as a party alleged a violation of a jus cogens norm, a court
would have to determine whether such a norm was indeed violated in
order to determine immunity—i.e., the merits would be reached. When
the foreign official is the defendant, there will effectively be no
immunity—a civil action by definition challenges the legality of the
official’s acts.88

In sum, the District Court for the District of Columbia found that there was
not adequate precedent to support plaintiff’s argument for a jus cogens
exception.89
In Smith v. Ghana Commercial Bank, Ltd., the District Court for the
District of Minnesota decided, in a case against a foreign official for fraud
86. Id. at 250 (citing Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). The District
Court stated, “Because the court [in Belhas] decided the issue under the FSIA, that holding does not
squarely govern the issue here regarding the effect of a jus cogens violation on foreign official
immunity for purposes of the common law. But as the Supreme Court noted in Samantar, rules that
appellate courts developed for foreign official immunity under the FSIA ‘may be correct as a matter of
common-law principles.’ . . . And the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Belhas is instructive.” Id. (quoting
Samantar, 560 U.S. at 322 n.17).
87. Id.
88. Id. In terms of foreign precedent, the District Court stated that “[B]oth the Second and
Seventh circuits have found [t]he Executive Branch's determination that a foreign leader should be
immune from suit even where the leader is accused of acts that violate jus cogens norms is established
by a suggestion of immunity. . . . Even the Supreme Court has suggested that jus cogens violations are
still official actions.” Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original) (citing
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993); Matar v. Dichter, 563 F. 3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009); Ye
v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir.2004)).
89. Id. (“[Plaintiffs] contend that [President Uribe] acted within his official capacity but illegally,
and hence such unlawful acts [involving violations of jus cogens norms] were outside the scope of his
official duties by definition. But that position is just what Belhas and other cases reject. Accordingly,
plaintiffs' allegations of jus cogens violations do not defeat former President Uribe's immunity.”)
Finally, the District Court found that if plaintiffs were to seek information related to unofficial actions
taken by the former Columbian president, they first needed to investigate whether there may be
alternative sources for this information. Id. at 252 (“The Court agrees with the position of the United
States that, although immunity is not available with respect to information relating to acts taken or
obtained by former President Uribe outside of his official capacity as a government official, comity and
foreign relations interests nonetheless require that all other reasonably available means to acquire such
information be exhausted before a deposition is permitted. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs were to
seek information unrelated to acts taken or obtained in respondent's official capacity, they must first
show that the information is both necessary and unavailable through other means.”).
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involving no executive branch guidance (i.e., the official was Ghana’s
attorney general at the time), that the appropriate test for foreign official
immunity under the common law was the rule contained in Section 66 of
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law: “‘[t]he immunity of a
foreign state . . . extends to . . . any other public minister, official, or agent
of the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if the
effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against
the state.”90 In particular, the Court said that:
The rule stated in Restatement § 66(f) is consistent with the principles
underlying the common law of foreign sovereign immunity. Allowing an
American court to reach the merits of a suit against a public official for
acts taken on behalf of the foreign state, and, thereby enforcing a rule of
law against the foreign state, would certainly affect the “power and
dignity” of that foreign state.91

In addition, the Court applied the rule from Samantar that certain official
capacity suits should be regarded as “actions against the foreign state itself,
as the state is the real party in interest.”92 Based on these rules, the Court in
Smith found that the foreign official, who was Ghana’s attorney general at
the time, enjoyed immunity from suit because the plaintiff’s allegations
concerned conduct by the attorney general in his official capacity.93
Finally, the court found that declaring that the attorney general of
Ghana was not entitled to foreign official immunity and exercising
jurisdiction over him would mean “‘enforc[ing] a rule of law against’ the
Republic of Ghana.”94 In the end, the court held that the Attorney General
90. No. 10–4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at *9 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (all alterations
in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (AM. LAW INST.
1965)).
91. Id. at *9.
92. Id. (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010)).
93. Id. at *10 (“Plaintiff's allegations against Ghana's Attorney General render the Republic of
Ghana the real party in interest here and show that Plaintiff seeks to hold the Attorney General liable for
acts performed in his official capacity. Indeed, Plaintiff states in his Complaint that references to
Defendants [including the Attorney General] throughout his Complaint are to be construed as
allegations concerning acts within the scope of Defendants' official duties.”). These duties primarily
consisted of the attorney general’s decision whether or not to pursue criminal charges against those
individuals who allegedly defrauded plaintiff (i.e., kept him from his money). Id.
94. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (AM. LAW INST.
1965)). See also id. (“At the core of the Attorney General's responsibilities as an agent of the Ghanaian
government is making decisions about how to pursue those accused of wrongdoing within Ghana's
territory. Were this Court to exercise jurisdiction, examine the merits of Plaintiff's claim that Ghana's
Attorney General allowed some unsavory characters to get away with fraud [and in the process take his
money], and conclude that the Attorney General's alleged failure to act subjected him to liability, we
would certainly be enforcing some rule of law against the Republic of Ghana.”).
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of Ghana was entitled to conduct-based, foreign official immunity under
the common law.95
Similarly, in Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia found that a suit against foreign officials
should be treated as a suit against the foreign state because the state (i.e.,
Iran) was the “real party in interest.”96 In Mohammadi, plaintiffs sued thenPresident of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s head of state, Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, along with Iran and its Revolutionary Guard
for torture, unlawful imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing under the
TVPA, ATS, and FSIA.97 The Court in Mohammadi found that Iran and the
Revolutionary Guard were immune from suit under the FSIA. The Court
reasoned that the terrorism exception to FSIA did not apply because
plaintiffs were not nationals of the United States when the alleged torture
and extrajudicial killings were committed.98
Second, with regard to plaintiffs’ claims against then-President
Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah Khamenei, the Court found that the state of
Iran was the “real party in interest” and that because Iran had immunity
under FSIA, the Court lacked jurisdiction. According to the Court,
Samantar left undecided the issue of which “actions against an official in
his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state
itself.”99 Though the Court refrained from determining exactly which
actions against an official in his official capacity should be treated in this
way, the Court did “conclude[] that in this case the foreign state of Iran is
the real party in interest, not Khamenei or Ahmadinejad.”100
The court reached its conclusion that Iran was the “real party in
interest” by looking to the nature of plaintiffs’ allegations and the overall

95. Id.
96. 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 72 (D.D.C. 2013).
97. Id. at 54. For the role of Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran’s government, see Akbar Ganji, Who is
Ali Khamenei? The Worldview of Iran’s Supreme Leader, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2013, at 24, 24
(“But the dominant figure in Iranian politics is not the president but rather the supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Iranian constitution endows the supreme leader with tremendous
authority over all major state institutions, and Khamenei, who has held the post since 1989, has found
many other ways to further increase his influence. Formally or not, the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the government all operate under his absolute sovereignty; Khamenei is Iran’s head
of state, commander in chief, and top ideologue.”).
98. Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“Since neither the claimants nor the non-plaintiff victim
(Akbar) were ‘nationals of the United States’ from 1999–2006, during which time the defendants
perpetrated the relevant acts of torture and extrajudicial killing, the plaintiffs do not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the FSIA's terrorism exception [to immunity].”).
99. Id. at 72 (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010)).
100. Id. Interestingly, the Court did not subject the claims against either then-current President
Ahmadinejad or the Ayatollah Khamenei to head of state immunity analysis.
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theory of the case. The Court emphasized that “plaintiffs make clear, both
in their Third Amended Complaint and in their briefing, that they are suing
defendants Khamenei and Ahmadinejad in their official, as opposed to their
personal, capacities. . . . It is [therefore] apparent that . . . any actions taken
by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad were actions of the Iranian ‘regime.’”101
B. Status-Based, Head of State Immunity Cases
In Manoharan v. Rajapaksa,102 a decision from the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the plaintiffs, who
were relatives of victims of alleged extrajudicial killings in Sri Lanka,
brought suit against defendant, the President of Sri Lanka, under the
TVPA. Citing Samantar, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
first applied the two-part test for foreign official immunity from The
Schooner Exchange. According to the court, “Under the first step of that
procedure, the only one that is relevant here, ‘the diplomatic representative
of the sovereign could request a ‘suggestion of immunity’ from the State
Department,’ and ‘[i]f the request was granted, the district court
surrendered its jurisdiction.’”103
101. Id. at 72 (citations omitted). See also Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 930 F. Supp. 2d 17,
34–35 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]o determine whether a suit against a foreign official is governed by the
FSIA, this Court must look to whether the suit is against the official personally or whether the state is
‘the real party in interest.’ If the suit is against the official personally, then the common law regarding
sovereign immunity applies, but if the state is ‘the real party in interest,’ then the suit should be treated
as an action against the foreign state itself to which the FSIA would apply. . . . Odhiambo’s suit against
the individual defendants will be governed by the FSIA because the suit is in all respects a suit against
the Kenyan government. This is a breach of contract case and the only contract at issue is between
Odhiambo and the Kenyan government. . . . Further, unlike the plaintiff in Samantar, Odhiambo has
sued the individual defendants in their official capacities. . . . And any damages that Odhiambo recovers
in this suit will be payable by the Kenyan government and not from the individual defendants’ ‘own
pockets.’ . . . Therefore, the Kenyan government is ‘the real party in interest’ and the suit against the
individual defendants will be treated as one against the Republic of Kenya. The Court’s FSIA analysis
thus applies to all defendants including the individuals.” (citations omitted)). The District Court in
Odhiambo determined that Kenya was immune from suit under the FSIA. See id. at 35.
102. 711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311). For a discussion of the
origins of the two-part test, see Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 845 F. Supp. 2d 260, 262–63 (D.D.C. 2012).
Also, the District Court in Rajapaksa based its decision to follow executive branch guidance on head of
state immunity because the executive branch is more well-suited to evaluating the foreign policy
implications of these immunity determinations: “As the Seventh Circuit explained [in Ye], ‘[t]he
determination to grant (or not grant) immunity can have significant implications for this country's
relationship with other nations. A court is ill-prepared to assess these implications and resolve the
competing concerns the Executive Branch is faced with in determining whether to immunize a head of
state.’ . . . This Court is not in a position to second-guess the Executive's determination that in this case,
the nation's foreign policy interests will be best served by granting Defendant [and President of Sri
Lanka] Rajapaksa head of state immunity while he is in office.” Id. at 266 (quoting Ye v. Zemin, 383
F.3d 620, 626–27 (7th Cir. 2004)). One possible type of foreign policy implication stemming from head
of state immunity determinations implicates the concern of reciprocity. See John Bellinger, Immunities,
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In Manoharan, the diplomatic representative had requested an SOI
and the U.S. State Department affirmatively granted it. As a result, the DC
Circuit found that defendant was entitled to immunity. The court treated as
“binding” the executive branch guidance granting head of state immunity
to defendant.104 In addition, the D.C. Circuit found that neither the
legislative history nor text of the TVPA indicated that it was meant to
override the common law of head of state immunity.105 In conclusion, the
court held that “[b]ecause, as a consequence of the State Department’s
suggestion of immunity, the defendant is entitled to head of state immunity
under the common law while he remains in office, and because the TVPA
did not abrogate that common law immunity, the judgment of the district
court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint is affirmed.”106
Similarly, in Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York relied upon the first part of the two-part procedure
described above to determine head of state immunity under the common
law, which essentially meant treating the “State Department’s immunity
decision[] [in the case as] mandatory . . . [and] binding and not subject to
judicial review.”107 Plaintiffs in Tawfik were Egyptian citizens residing in
Kuwait who were also members of a political organization that worked to
further democratic governance in Egypt. They were arrested by the Kuwaiti
police and allegedly subjected to torture, rape, and other abuses.108
Plaintiffs sued various defendants, including the sitting head of state of
Kuwait, Sheihk Al-Sabah.109 After obtaining a default judgment against
Sheihk Al-Sabah, Plaintiffs requested a hearing on damages. However,
before the hearing, the United States Department of State issued an SOI
affirmatively granting immunity to Sheihk Al–Sabah.110

available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/18/immunities/> (last visited 6/4/16) (The … official
immunity rules the United States applies domestically [including head of state immunity] have
important implications for how the United States and its officials are treated abroad. “)
104. See Manoharan, 711 F.3d at 179 (citing Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir.
1989)). Note that the Court did say that “[t]his case does not require us to decide what deference we
should give to the State Department when the Department indicates that a defendant, whether a sitting
head of state or otherwise, should not receive immunity.” Id. at 180 n.1.
105. Id. at 179–80.
106. Id. at 180 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
107. Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455(ALC)(JCF), 2012 WL 3542204, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
22, 2012).
108. Id. at *1. Plaintiffs were allegedly arrested at the request of the Egyptian President. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *1, *3.
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The Court, relying in part upon Samantar, also found that the
enactment of FSIA in 1976 did not alter the nature of sitting head of state
immunity determinations:
Since 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), rather
than the prior common law framework, has governed the standards for
determining whether foreign states are amenable to suit. . . . [T]he preFSIA practice of judicial deference to the State Department’s immunity
determinations, [however,] remains intact in the context of immunity for
sitting heads of state.111

Because the United States Department of State had issued an SOI granting
immunity to the sitting head of state of Kuwait, Sheihk Al–Sabah, the
District Court in Al-Sabah deferred absolutely to this executive branch
determination.112
Finally, in the post-Samantar case of Smith v. Ghana Commercial
Bank, Ltd., also discussed above for its relevance to the foreign official
immunity issue, since there was no executive SOI, the District Court
decided on its own that the President of Ghana, who was another defendant
in the case, was entitled to head of state immunity in a suit alleging fraud.
In particular, the court refused to consider plaintiff’s claim that the
President, John A. Mills, should have chosen different methods to identify
and investigate the persons who allegedly defrauded him (i.e., the plaintiff).
The court refused to consider plaintiff’s claim because it believed that by
doing so, “it would be directly interfering with President Mills’ duty to
enforce Ghana’s laws.”113 In addition, the court found that to prevent such
interference, common law doctrines such as comity meant that “a head of
state is immune from suit.”114 Finally, the court explained that “the head of
state of a foreign sovereign [here, President Mills] enjoys immunity from
suit at least to the same extent as the state itself, . . . and a foreign state

111. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at *3. See also Habyarimana v. Kagame, 821 F.Supp. 2d 1244, 1260–64 (W.D. Okla.
2011) (adopting approach of absolute deference to State Department SOI asserting head of state
immunity for Rwandan President because of Executive’s primary role in foreign policy arena and
separation of powers concerns).
113. No. 10–4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at *8 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (footnote and
citations omitted). See also id. at *7 (noting that “[h]ere, because the State Department has filed no
suggestion of immunity, this Court must address step two of the established procedure”—i.e., the court
decides on its own whether immunity requirements have been met, basing its decision on whether the
immunity ground has a basis in executive branch policy).
114. Id. (“Comity and each nation's mutual respect for the exclusive and absolute authority within
one another's respective territories are the backbone of the common law of foreign sovereign
immunity.”).
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[e.g., Ghana] cannot be subject to suit for decisions concerning whether or
how to investigate fraud between private parties.”115 In sum, the court
determined that the President of Ghana enjoyed immunity from suit.116
Thus, the limited, extant federal district court case law that has emerged
following Samantar reflects a reluctance to embrace a jus cogens exception
to conduct-based, foreign official immunity or to deviate too far from
executive branch guidance in this area. In addition, this jurisprudence has
begun to develop certain criteria for deciding when the state is “the real
party in interest” in a lawsuit again a foreign official (for example, an
examination of the substance or “nature of the allegations”). When the state
is the real party in interest, the FSIA and not the common law applies to the
underlying immunity claim. In the head-of-state immunity context, the
post-Samantar jurisprudence appears to maintain the common law practice
of deferring to the guidance of the executive branch on the question of
immunity.
IV. ANALYSIS
Four main issues emerging from the jurisprudence in the wake of
Samantar are explored in this Part: (1) the implications of the recent
circuit-split on the appropriate level of deference to executive SOIs in the
conduct-based, foreign official immunity context, (2) the implications of
the split concerning whether conduct-based immunity should be granted to
foreign officials in cases of alleged jus cogens violations, (3) status-based,
head of state immunity issues, and (4) strategic considerations for putative
plaintiffs suing foreign officials for human rights abuses and other alleged
wrongs in U.S. courts.
A. The Split Concerning the “Weight” to Give Executive Branch Guidance:
Conduct-Based, Foreign Official Immunity Context
The circuit split regarding the amount of deference to give executive
branch SOIs in the conduct-based, foreign official immunity context bears
certain implications, including those related to fairness, deterrence, case
predictability, and jurisprudential development. Because of the split,
foreign official defendants in U.S. courts may, for example, receive
different outcomes in similar cases, creating injustice or unfairness across
cases and deterrence-related challenges. Deterrence-related challenges have
the potential to exacerbate impunity for grave human rights violations. In
addition, the split may make it increasingly difficult for litigants in certain
115. Id.
116. Id.
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courts to predict immunity determinations in individual cases. That
unpredictability could impact the decision-making calculus for litigants and
create associated inefficiencies (e.g., wasting scarce judicial and other
resources, preventing or delaying further jurisprudential development, etc.).
The Fourth Circuit has determined that executive branch SOIs in the
conduct-based, foreign official immunity context are entitled to
considerable or substantial deference, but the Second Circuit has held that
these same SOIs are entitled to absolute deference.117 Accordingly, one can
imagine a scenario in the wake of this split where two factually identical or
substantially similar conduct-based, foreign official immunity cases are
presented to the executive branch by the diplomatic representative of the
foreign state (under the two-step procedure outlined above), and the
executive branch recommends immunity in each case. This may be because
the executive believes that the conduct in question, done while the foreign
official was in office, consisted of official and state duties. One potential
approach to such cases is that taken by the Second Circuit, which defers
absolutely to the executive branch, by essentially adopting the executive’s
view of whether the defendant/ foreign official is entitled to immunity.
117. See supra notes 63 and 77 and accompanying text. For differing assessments by scholars on
the proper weight courts should give executive branch guidance on the immunity question, compare
Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against The State
Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 915 (2011) (rejecting executive branch “lawmaking” power to
make individual foreign official immunity determinations that are binding on the judiciary) with Lewis
S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 911
(2011) (arguing that the State Department’s practice of deciding head of state immunity is “an example
of sole executive lawmaking, deriving from the President's constitutional responsibility as the only
authorized representative of the United States in its relations with foreign states”). Professor Wuerth
argued that inconsistencies may arise in individual foreign official immunity cases following Samantar
if executive SOIs are given controlling weight; for example, “the executive branch sometimes [may
suggest] immunity in a case where its prior policy was to deny immunity on essentially the same facts.”
Wuerth, supra, at 945; see also id. (“If the executive suggestion system is retained in claims against
individual officials [i.e., as is possible after Samantar], claims against states themselves will
nevertheless still be governed by the FSIA with very little or no deference to the executive branch. But
there are many issues of overlap in resolving these two types of claims, substantially raising the costs
and likelihood of inconsistent adjudications.” (footnote omitted)). And, significantly, Professor Wuerth
saw as one implication of inconsistent adjudications the “undermin[ing of] diplomatic objectives and
the confidence of other countries.” Id. at 952. Finally, Professor Wuerth envisioned that the incentive
“calculus” for putative plaintiffs would change in the wake of Samantar, thereby leading to an increase
in cases: “Before Samantar, most courts had held that the FSIA covered individuals as well, leaving
little or no opportunity for State Department suggestions of immunity. After Samantar, however,
plaintiffs have greater incentives to sue both the state and an individual, especially if they expect the
State Department to be sympathetic to their claim. Plaintiffs also have a greater incentive to sue the
individual even if they believe the state is immune because the two cases could now be treated
differently.” Id. at 948 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 949 (“In the government’s hands, immunity
determinations are thus likely to be opaque and difficult to predict—increasing the incentives to sue
individual defendants even if it appears likely they should be immune for suit. An increase in cases also
increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications. . . .”).
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However, a different court adjudicating the other, substantially similar case
could decide to follow the approach of the Fourth Circuit giving the
executive immunity determination considerable or substantial deference
and conducting its own independent immunity determination. Moreover,
this latter court may decide to abrogate the executive determination of
immunity because, for example, it believes some of the conduct in question
was ultimately private in nature or because some of the conduct was
performed before the official formally took office.
Regardless of the reason for reversing a given executive immunity
determination, the possibility that courts (or the executive, for that matter)
may make divergent immunity determinations on the same or similar facts
presents certain challenges. This has the potential to lead to perceived
injustice across cases. Putative abusers and other wrongdoers may attempt
to escape liability by obtaining a favorable immunity decision from the
executive branch (i.e., if that branch’s guidance is found to be “absolute”).
Not only does this lead to deterrence-related problems, but it also invites a
return to the pre-FSIA traditions of politically-oriented appeals to the
executive for immunity—as opposed to judicially-determined immunity
outcomes based on pre-established rules and norms, such as those provided
under the FSIA.118 The fervency of these appeals, of course, will only be
heightened in conduct-based, foreign official immunity cases in which
executive branch guidance is anticipated to be controlling in nature. Even
in cases where deference to executive branch SOIs is less than controlling,
118. Here, the discussion of human rights abuses refers to ones falling below the threshold of jus
cogens violations, such as indiscriminate killings or pillaging. Jus cogens violations will be addressed
later in the analysis. For the general idea that political pressure will be applied to the executive to
influence its guidance related to immunity, see Curtis A. Bradley &. Lawrence R. Helfer, International
Law and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 243–59 (2010)
(“After Samantar, the question of whether federal courts should defer to the Executive’s view regarding
immunity will be a key point of contention . . . At a minimum, foreign governments are likely to
pressure the State Department to suggest immunity in a non-trivial number of cases, much as they did in
the years prior to the FSIA’s adoption. Conversely, U.S. human rights advocates may urge the
department to intervene on behalf of plaintiffs by indicating that immunity would not be appropriate.”).
Id. at 259 (citing and quoting John B. Bellinger III, Ruling Burdens State Dept., Natl L J (June 28,
2010)). Also, the deterrence equation may be influenced by other possible factors, such as the
possibility of criminal prosecution, the deterioration in the reputation/ status of one’s country (and its
accompanying impact on foreign relations), or even civil suits in other countries. But the deterrence
impact from possible civil suits in the United States should not be underestimated because the United
States has become a major forum for the adjudication of human rights claims with little or no
connection to it. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual
Officials and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 10 (2010) (“Since Filartiga, plaintiffs
from around the globe have relied on the ATS to sue in U.S. courts for human rights abuses. In many of
these suits, as in Filartiga, a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign official for an alleged violation of
international law committed on foreign soil.”). Finally, many current and former officials, including
former heads of state, may want to travel to or even reside in the United States.
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political pressure should still be rather strong. In turn, this pressure in
individual foreign official cases and associated foreign policy
considerations could itself result in inconsistent immunity determinations
by the executive branch across cases.
B. The Split on Jus Cogens Exceptions: Foreign Official, Conduct-Based
Immunity Context
Interestingly, in the years since Samantar was decided, a circuit split
has emerged on whether to recognize an exception to conduct-based
immunity for foreign officials in the case of alleged jus cogens violations.
The Fourth Circuit, relying on its own and international precedent,
determined that a jus cogens exception existed, while the Second Circuit
concluded that immunity persevered even in the face of jus cogens
violations. The Fourth Circuit has reasoned that jus cogens violations do
not constitute “official acts” warranting conduct-based, foreign official
immunity.119 The divergence that has developed on the jus cogens issue
presents similar difficulties to the disagreement among the circuits about
the proper weight to accord executive branch guidance on the foreign
official immunity question (i.e., the “conduct-based” variety). For example,
similar and rather evident perceptions of injustice may arise when one
defendant who has committed heinous human rights abuses—torture,
extrajudicial killings, genocide, and the like—receives immunity for his or
her official acts while another court pierces the immunity veil, finds
liability, and awards damages. In addition, any deterrent effects may
become more attenuated when certain courts choose to grant immunity in
the jus cogens context, and these effects may themselves be more
consequential in light of the egregious nature of the conduct. However, the
split that has developed surrounding the jus cogens exception to immunity
in U.S. circuit courts may itself reflect the state of uncertainty in customary
international law and among foreign national precedents on this question,
particularly in the civil context.120 In any event, as other circuits further
119. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit); see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text (Second Circuit).
120. See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 118, at 243 (“International tribunals have yet to take a
definitive position on whether there is a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity in civil
cases.”). See also id. at 259 (noting that “international law does not require that U.S. courts hear civil
suits against foreign officials”). On a related note, Professors Bradley and Helfer also argued that “it is
likely that [customary international law] will influence judicial assessments of common law immunity
claims raised in human rights litigation after Samantar.” Id. at 272; see also Chimène Keitner, Foreign
Official Immunity and the Baseline Problem, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 612, 613 (2011) (“[In Jones v.
Saudi Arabia], Lord Bingham observed that there is no overwhelming international consensus requiring
states to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over serious international law violations. However, even if
this were true, it does not mean that states are prohibited from exercising civil jurisdiction within the
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develop their jurisprudence on this issue in the wake of Samantar, they
will, in turn, contribute to the development of customary international law
in this context. But any development in this area, at least in terms of the
contribution from the United States, will be incremental and gradual unless
and until the U.S. Supreme Court intervenes to resolve the circuit split or
the U.S. Congress passes legislation providing a resolution.
C. Head of State Immunity Issue
In the wake of Samantar, American courts appear to agree that
executive guidance is determinative on the question of status-based, head
of state immunity. This viewpoint stems from the notions of comity and
respect for another nation’s authority within its own territory as well as the

[other] limits . . . Even if Lord Bingham's conclusion were correct, it would mean only that [the United
Kingdom’s statute regarding foreign official immunity] is not . . . inconsistent with . . . international
law. Although the United Kingdom's decision to grant individuals immunity under its [immunity
statute] does count as state practice for the purpose of customary international law formation, that
decision is not uniformly reflected in the legislative and judicial choices of other countries.” (footnote
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Note that the Jones v. Saudi Arabia case was appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights (the ECHR), and the ECHR essentially affirmed Lord Bingham’s
earlier ruling in Jones under the United Kingdom’s state immunity act, which had found immunity from
civil suit for torture allegedly perpetrated by a foreign government and its officials. See Emile
MacKenzie, International Law in Brief: European Court of Human Rights Delivers Judgment on State
Immunity in Jones v. United Kingdom (January 14, 2014), AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, (Jan. 23, 2014
5:19 PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/european-court-human-rights-delivers-judgment-state-immunityjones-v-united-kingdom-january-14> (“On January 14, 2014, the Fourth Section of the European Court
of Human Rights (the Court) issued its judgment . . . in Jones and Others v. United Kingdom. The Court
found that the United Kingdom (UK) had not violated the right of access to court under Article 6 § 1 of
the European Convention on Human Rights when UK courts granted immunity to Saudi Arabia and its
State officials, thus dismissing the Applicants’ [civil] claims for compensation for torture they allegedly
suffered at the hands of Saudi Arabian officials. The Court stated that ‘measures taken by a State which
reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be
regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court as embodied in
Article 6 § 1.’ However, the Court concluded that ‘in light of the developments currently under way in
this area of public international law, this is a matter which needs to be kept under review.’”); see also
Sevrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus cogens, 9 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 149, 156
(2011) (“So far, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the only international court to have
dealt with the [separate] issue [of an exception to state immunity for gross human rights violations], has
rejected the view that a grant of immunity to the respondent state in a damage claim for acts of torture
violated the individual's right of access to a court guaranteed by the European Convention on Human
Rights.”). More recently, the International Court of Justice in the Germany v. Italy case decided that
there was no jus cogens exception to state immunity. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, International
Decisions: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece Intervening), 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. 609, 609, 611–12 (2012) (“[T]he International Court of Justice decided that, by allowing civil
claims against Germany for wartime [World War II] atrocities to proceed before Italian courts, the
Italian Republic had violated its obligation to respect Germany's sovereign immunity. . . . Turning to
Italy's claim that the German acts in question violated jus cogens and were thus not entitled to
immunity, the Court disagreed, finding no conflict between jus cogens and rules of state immunity.”
(footnote omitted)).
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executive branch’s constitutional power to receive and appoint
ambassadors.121 The conclusion is also grounded in a desire to maintain
cordial relations among states and to avoid any reciprocal, negative
consequences for American heads of state travelling abroad.122 Finally,
executive branch SOIs are binding because the branch may be better suited
to evaluate the foreign policy considerations underpinning head of state
immunity determinations.123And, notably, even when the executive branch
does not provide an SOI in a case involving a claim of head of state
immunity, the court’s own analysis related to the immunity question must
be based on previous executive policies and grounds for bestowing
immunity (e.g., as evidenced in earlier SOIs from similar contexts).124
Though courts in the wake of Samantar have acknowledged in dicta
that it may be possible to pierce the immunity veil for heads of state in the
case of conduct committed in a “private capacity,”125 no post-Samantar
case appears to have done so. In addition, head of state immunity may be
abrogated if the U.S. government does not recognize the official as head of
state (or does not recognize the government for which the head of state
serves).126 And in the FSIA era—and ostensibly continuing following
Samantar—the foreign state could waive the immunity of its head.127
Finally, the resolution of sitting head of state immunity questions in
the United States appears to align with that of customary international law
(at least in the criminal context).128 For example, the Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 case by the International Court of Justice, though it involved a
sitting foreign minister, likely supports the general proposition that
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign state attaches to
incumbent heads of state. However, similar exceptions to this general

121. See supra note 114 and accompanying text; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 103, 114 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 56, 112 and accompanying
text.
125. See, e.g., Smith v. Ghana Comm. Bank, Ltd., No. 10–4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at
*8 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012).
126. See supra notes 50, 60 and accompanying text.
127. See Christopher Totten, Head-of-State and Foreign Official Immunity in the United States
after Samantar: A Suggested Approach, 34 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 332, 347–48 (2011); Lafontant v.
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D. Fl. 1993).
No cases in the post-Samantar head of state immunity context appear to suggest that waiver of
immunity by the foreign state is no longer available.
128. BETH VAN SCHAAK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 1063 (3d ed. 2014) (“The ICJ held [in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 case] that
under customary international law, sitting foreign ministers enjoy full immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of another state . . . .”).
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immunity rule exist, such as a waiver by the home state allowing
prosecution in a third state as well as prosecutions by international
tribunals.129
D. Post-Samantar Strategies for Plaintiffs
With regard to incumbent heads of state asserting status-based
immunity, obtaining a waiver of immunity from the foreign government is
one way to overcome that official’s immunity (and perhaps the most certain
path). Short of obtaining a waiver, putative plaintiffs could apply pressure
on the executive branch of the United States to issue an SOI declining
immunity, whether by highlighting a particularly abhorrent series of human
rights abuses committed under the head of state’s supervision or by
recommending that the U.S. government decline to recognize the
individual’s status as head of state or government.130 Finally, before both
executive branch officials and in court, plaintiffs attempting to sue heads of
state may argue that the conduct in question is purely private in nature and
not connected in any way to the head’s public duties.
The post-Samantar jurisprudence suggests several other tactics for
potential plaintiffs bringing human rights or other suits against foreign
officials who have asserted conduct-based immunity.131 As in the statusbased, head of state immunity context, a waiver of immunity by the
official’s home state could be obtained, or pressure could be brought to
bear against the executive branch because the official is not entitled to
immunity, whether because the conduct was “private” in nature or because
the conduct occurred prior to the official’s assumption of office.132 The
129. Id. The ICJ noted in dicta that “there were three ways that a Foreign Minister could be held
accountable for violations of international criminal law while still in office. First, the home state of the
Foreign Minister could prosecute him. Second, the state could waive the immunity, thus allowing
another state to prosecute him. Third, the immunity was not valid against a prosecution undertaken by
an international tribunal.” Id. (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14)).
130. See supra notes 60, 118 and accompanying text.
131. For example, these suits could be brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(“TVPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (subjecting defendant to potential civil liability for torture and
extrajudicial killing).
132. For the idea that there may be a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity, see supra
note 67 and accompanying text. For the waiver possibility, albeit in the related head of state context, see
supra note 127. See also Chimène Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, VAND. J. TRANS.
L. 837, 855 (2011) (noting that if the foreign government recognized by the United States has not
requested conduct-based immunity, “or if the foreign state has waived immunity, then the consensus
appears to be that there should be no immunity, because immunity is for the benefit of the state, not the
individual”). Note that Professor Keitner puts forth a list of five questions that can be asked “in order to
determine whether or not a particular individual who is not covered by an existing treaty or statute is
entitled to conduct-based immunity as a matter of common law.” Id. at 855–58. In addition to waiver,
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“private” conduct may consist of particularly heinous human rights abuses,
including jus cogens violations.
But in the post-Samantar jurisprudential landscape, there is
uncertainty about whether the executive branch’s guidance on the foreign
official, conduct-based immunity question will be viewed as “binding” by a
court.133 There is also uncertainty about whether courts will find a jus
cogens exception to this type of immunity.134 Concerning the proper weight
for courts to accord executive guidance, for plaintiffs who “lose” on the
foreign official immunity question before the executive, there may still be
an additional opportunity following Samantar for plaintiffs to argue
successfully in court that immunity is not warranted. This opportunity
would exist in those situations where courts view executive branch
guidance as entitled to some deference but not controlling deference. For
those plaintiffs who “win” on the immunity question before the executive,
there is the also the possibility, however, that these courts will overturn the
executive’s finding. In addition, for plaintiffs who obtain executive branch
guidance on the foreign official immunity question, whether favorable or
not, there is also the possibility in the wake of Samantar that this guidance
will be essentially determinative (i.e., because the particular court will view
it as binding). In these courts, plaintiffs who obtain a favorable immunity
determination from the executive will be able to assert and have their
claims heard and possibly obtain a damages award. These different judicial
approaches to the treatment of executive branch guidance in the wake of
Samantar suggest plaintiffs may want to engage, to the extent possible, in
strategic “forum shopping;” for example, selecting a court that is most
likely to “pierce” the immunity veil and address the merits of the plaintiffs
claims (i.e., in those cases where the executive guidance is unfavorable), or
choosing a court that is most likely to uphold the executive’s determination
(i.e., in those cases where the executive guidance is favorable).135 Such an
approach may also be warranted in light of the different court approaches
to the jus cogens exception. Though such a “forum-shopping” strategy may

these questions relate to whether the conduct by the foreign official was attributable to the state,
whether the conduct was performed with actual authority, whether the defendant is present within the
U.S. at the time of arrest or service, and whether Congress has attached legal consequences to the
conduct. Id. For support for the notion that conduct-based immunity would not apply to conduct
performed prior to the official’s assumption of office, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 63, 77 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 69, 77 and accompanying text.
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012) (generally basing proper venue on defendant’s place of
residence/domicile and the location of where the relevant conduct occurred); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c)(3) (2012) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district .
. . .” (emphasis added)).
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make good, practical sense from a litigation standpoint, it is not without
certain potential consequences. For example, the continued development of
the jurisprudence along disparate “lines” may be facilitated through
aggressive adoption of this strategy by plaintiffs (for example, separate
lines favoring and opposing a jus cogens exception for grave human rights
violations). As a result, the inconsistencies in the jurisprudence will
become more marked and entrenched, leading to additional challenges
related to deterrence, impunity and fairness.
Yet one additional strategy may be emerging in the wake of Samantar
for plaintiffs bringing suits against foreign officials for human rights
abuses. In certain cases where plaintiffs have attempted to sue the foreign
official directly (i.e., as opposed to his or her government or state), courts
have determined that the “real party in interest” is the state itself and
proceeded to apply FSIA and not the common law. This judicial reasoning,
which is supported by Samantar itself, has resulted in outcomes granting
conduct-based immunity to defendants under the FSIA for their official
conduct.136 In order to possibly avoid the general, “default” grant of
immunity under the FSIA, and proceed under the potentially more lenient
common law, plaintiffs may want to more explicitly and specifically frame
their allegations and case theory directly against defendants in their
personal capacities.137 For example, in order to possibly increase their
chances of “piercing” the immunity veil and to the extent possible under
the case facts, plaintiffs could frame their allegations as involving conduct
directly attributable to the defendant himself without explicit connection to
the state.138 In this regard, plaintiffs could seek damages exclusively from
the defendant and not the state.139
In sum, in the context of plaintiffs seeking to sue foreign official
defendants in U.S. courts, the following sequential approach may be
preferred in light of the post-Samantar jurisprudential landscape:
(1) Obtain a waiver of immunity from the official’s home government
and/or apply pressure on the Executive Branch to issue an SOI
expressly denying immunity to the official;
136. See supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text; see also supra note 88 and accompanying
text; Keitner, supra note 132, at 847 (“The defendant can claim that the state is the real party in interest
. . . if the relief sought would run directly against the state. If the state is the real party in interest, the
claim against the defendant should be dismissed based on common law immunity or failure to name the
real party in interest; the plaintiff might be required to refile the complaint against the state itself under
the FSIA . . . .”).
137. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (referring to “personal capacity” versus
“official capacity” suits).
139. See supra notes 45, 101 and accompanying text.
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(2) To the extent possible, engage in forum shopping by selecting a
court that is most likely to “pierce” the immunity veil and address
the merits of the claims in those cases where the executive
guidance on immunity is unfavorable or a foreign government
waiver is not obtained, or alternatively, choosing a court that is
most likely to uphold a foreign government waiver or the
executive’s determination in those cases where the executive
guidance is favorable).
(3) To increase the chance of avoiding the application of FSIA and its
general grant of immunity and instead proceed under the
potentially more favorable common law, explicitly frame
allegations and case theory against defendants in their personal or
private capacities (i.e., as opposed to against the state), and seek
damages exclusively from the defendant himself.
CONCLUSION
The common law of foreign official, conduct-based immunity is in a
state of flux. As a result, even the most deserving plaintiffs face barriers to
suit. The uncertainty may mean that two foreign official defendants with
similar case facts experience different outcomes depending on where a
lawsuit is brought, leading to concerns related to deterrence and overall
fairness. The uncertainty may also make it more difficult for individual
litigants to predict likely immunity findings. This, in turn, may lead to
fewer case settlements and an accompanying strain on the resources of both
the plaintiff and the judiciary. The uncertainty or unpredictability may also
have the opposite effect of delaying jurisprudential development, if
putative plaintiffs (incorrectly) perceive their chances of winning a lawsuit
to be weak, and therefore decline to bring suit. On the jus cogens issue in
particular, it is at least possible that the split among the U.S. circuits
reflects the state of uncertainty in customary international law and among
foreign national precedents on this question. Though U.S. courts can
contribute to the further development of customary law on this issue, its
ultimate resolution, at least in the U.S., awaits a future decision by the
Supreme Court (or perhaps legislation by the U.S. Congress). Regarding
status-based, head of state immunity following Samantar, a clear consensus
has developed that executive guidance is determinative. In addition, a
limited number of exceptions to this immunity have been explored in the
case law. Finally, the post-Samantar jurisprudence suggests several
strategies for putative plaintiffs suing heads of state and foreign officials
claiming immunity for human rights abuses and other wrongs, including
seeking a waiver from the foreign state and applying pressure on the
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executive branch. In the case of suits against foreign officials alleging
conduct-based immunity, plaintiffs may wish, to the extent possible, to
engage in strategic “forum-shopping” as well as frame their allegations and
case theory in particular ways. These tactics nonetheless do not guarantee
that American courts will ultimately pierce the immunity veil and address
the merits of the underlying claim.

